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Abstract
This article examines the effect of social networks by investigating how mobilizing family, friendship
or kindship ties in job searches affects the quality of employment (QoE) using a mixed approach.
Drawing from socioeconomic literature on the segmented labor market, the authors propose an original
and multidimensional measure of job quality and a fruitful estimation of the effect of social networks
on QoE that allows for dealing with complex inter-groups heterogeneity. Using the Great Integrated
Household Survey (GIHS) and a sample on Bogota’s workers in 2013, they provide empirical support
that the use of ties is negatively correlated with the QoE for those who are vulnerable. Likewise, the use
of social relations is not significant for protected workers. Complemented by focus groups interviews,
these results raise questions about the difference prevailing in relational practices between necessity
networks for precarious workers and opportunity networks for protected workers in the Colombian
capital.
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1 Introduction
Jobs and quality of employment are important challenges facing developing countries for their structural
transformation (World Bank 2013; McMillan et al. 2014; OECD 2016). Since the 1980s, the context of
increasing globalization, urbanization and political mutations has made it difficult to characterize urban
labor market dynamics. However, a proper grasp of this social sphere is crucial in order to efficiently orient
public policies on employment.
In a socioeconomic perspective, to understand the dynamics of labor markets it is essential to analyze the
social and institutional processes in which individuals and markets are embedded (Callon 1998; Smelser
and Swedberg 2005). Since Granovetter’s seminal study ([1974] 1995), sociological and economic litera-
tures have emphasized the importance of social networks in market functioning and in individual behaviors
(Rauch and Cassella 2001; Smith-Doerr and Powell 2005; Jackson 2014). This relational embeddedness
of economic actions means that abstracting from social interactions comes with the risk of severely mis-
understanding behaviors and their causes (Granovetter 1985, 2017). In fact, designing many economic
policies requires a deep understanding of social relations and network effects (Beaman 2016; Jackson et
al. 2017). In developed labor markets, research on informal contacts shows that a major part of jobs
and activities are obtained or developed through family, friends or relatives (Marsden and Gorman 2001;
Topa 2011). A fortiori, this issue is crucial in developing countries which are characterized by the failure
of formal institutions to channel information about market opportunities and in which social networks
are employed very frequently in job search activity (Yakubovitch 2005; Fafchamps 2006; Nordman and
Pasquier-Doumer 2015). In different institutional contexts, relational embeddedness plays an important
but also ambiguous role in determining various labor market outcomes (Datcher Loury 2006; Pellizarri
2010; Matsuda and Nomura 2017). In fact, there are as many studies showing that social networks are
positively correlated with better earnings and labor status (Kugler 2003; Magruder 2010; Yogo 2011) as
there are demonstrating the opposite (Elliott and Sims 2001; Chua 2011; Diaz 2012).
In this article, we revisit these ambiguous results through an original framework observing the use of
social networks in a segmented labor market. According to Bentolila et al. (2010), two main types of net-
works should generate contrasting results on the labor market, and these differential effects are influenced
by the heterogeneity and the multi-segmentation of labor markets, particularly in developing countries
(Fields 2011). However, the heterogeneity of labor market outcomes is complex and inevitably comes
under a multidimensional process, mixing social institutions and legal regulations (Kalleberg et al. 2000;
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Hudson 2007). In this way, using the quality of employment concept1 seems crucial (Osterman 2013;
Burchell et al. 2014). This multidimensional approach holds a considerable interest, allowing for the pre-
cise analysis of employment forms and their further evolution while abandoning the classical typologies of
the labor markets in a developing context (Floro and Messier 2011; Farné and Vergara 2015; Combarnous
and Deguilhem 2016). In developed countries, few studies have emphasized the relation between social
networks and quality of employment (Granovetter [1974] 1995:13-14). Yet they offer two unidimensional
measures of job quality, holding income and job satisfaction as two fruitless approximations (Burchell et al.
2014). In developing countries, Nordman and Pasquier-Doumer (2015) have documented this issue with
an approximation of quality of employment levels through a dichotomy between self-employment and wage
employment (Bocquier et al. 2010). However, Combarnous and Deguilhem (2016) have shown that this
typology is not relevant for dealing with the complexity of urban labor market in Colombia. Indeed, there
is no longer a clear divide between job quality for employees and independents, which is in accordance
with the idea of a continuum across employment statuses (Tokman 2007). In the specific Latin-American
context, this paper seeks to analyze the determinants of quality of employment for workers in urban labor
markets by highlighting the role played by the use of social networks.
Tackling these crucial questions for employment policies in Colombia, we outline an original empirical
strategy to introduce a three-fold contribution to the line of research that investigates social networks
in Latin American labor markets. First, we use a mixed approach combining a representative sample of
workers in Bogota’s labor market with focus group interviews to best capture the diversity of relational
practices between workers’ groups. Second, an original methodology is formulated to construct an index
on thirteen variables corresponding to the six interconnected dimensions of the job quality concept and
capturing Bogota’s labor market institutions. Third, dealing with complex inter-groups heterogeneity, we
offer an accurate estimation of the differential effects of the use of social networks on vulnerable versus
protected workers.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional context of the Bogota’s urban
labor market, the data and the focus groups scheme. Section 3 introduces the theoretical framework, the
method adopted to construct a relevant QoE index and the semi-parametric estimation strategy. Section 4
presents the econometric results and qualitatively explores qualitatively the raison d’être of the differential
effects of networks for different workers groups. Finally, the last section discusses the findings and the
methodological approach.
1See Burchell et al. (2014) for a specific overview on the quality of employment concept.
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2 Context and Data
2.1 Bogota’s urban and labor market contexts
In 2013, the city of Bogota had nearly 7.6 million inhabitants, compared to 715,000 in 1951. It now
represents nearly 17% of the Colombian population, an 87% increase from 1985. Despite a low birth
rate, and a downward trend in the average annual urbanization rate – going from 7% between 1950
and 1955 to 1.36% between 2010 and 2015 – the capital district remains marked by the urban change
arising from internal migration. It forms a “hub of the territorial system,” hosting populations from the
forced displacements caused by internal conflict (Dureau et al. 2015:35). Faced with expanding informal
urbanization and growing inequalities, the government implemented a socioeconomic space stratification
method to introduce a mixed subsidy mechanism for municipal services payments. Various homogeneous
groups of buildings (6 groups) were established on the basis of the land registry zones. These “blocks” of
homogeneous residences provide a satisfactory approximation of the social hierarchy: the poorest (1, 2 and
3), representing almost 90% of the population in 2013, receive support for between 40% and 10% of the cost
of services, whereas the richest (5 and 6) pay a surcharge of between 40% and 20%. Since the introduction
of this policy, Bogota has followed an insular, residentially-segregated developmental logic, between a
northeastern zone occupied by the wealthiest households, a southern area inhabited by poor households,
and a western area occupied by the middle class (Dureau et al. 2015:113-114). This social hierarchization
directly determines household location decisions and influences social group identity in terms of access
to education, healthcare and employment (SDP 2013). Unlike other Andean metropolis, Bogota has a
relatively low rate of poverty at 17% in 2011. It remains high, however in the south of the city and in
stratum 1 and 2: 40% for stratum 1 and 25% for stratum 2 (SDP 2013). Illustrating this heterogeneous
situation, the capital city has observed a significant increase in income inequality, with the Gini index
for income increasing from 0.51 in 2008 to 0.61 in 2013.2 Moreover, in 2013 the Bogota’s labor market
concerns more than 4 millions people, with an occupation rate of 65,5% and 9% of unemployment. Like
other Latin American countries, 34% of active workers appear in subjective underemployment, 21.7% in
skill-related inadequate employment and 28.2% in income-related inadequate employment (DANE 2014).3
To challenge these facts and implement appropriate employment policies, the Servicio Publico del Empleo
(SPE) was established in the last trimester of 2013 in Colombia (Law 1636 of 2013), but more than 65%
of workers found their current job through their social relations in the same year.4
2The 2008 Gini index came from Bogota’s Department of District Planning (SDP 2013). Authors have calculated the
2013 Gini index on the basis of the 2013 household survey.
3In 2013, the monthly minimum wage was 589 500 pesos (Article 145 of the Codigo Sustantivo de Trabajo).
4Authors calculations.
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2.2 Quantitative and qualitative data
The data comes from the 2013 Great Integrated Household Survey (GIHS) produced by the National
Administrative Department of Statistics. Our analysis covers a representative sample of 5,846 workers
(18-95 years old) who are employed in Bogota’s labor market. As such, workers between 15 and 17 years
old are excluded because they do not have “normal” rights in their working conditions. Moreover, we
excluded workers working more than 120 hours per week.5 Socioeconomic covariates were drawn from
the individual, household and employment characteristics that are relevant for the Bogota’s labor market
analysis (Appendix B).
Moreover, we complement the quantitative approach with focus groups interviews. Following Crossley
et al. (2015:62), “qualitative methods are useful for investigating unexplored networks; concrete acts,
practices and interactions; actors’ perceptions and assessment of relationships [...].” In other words, with
qualitative methods we explore the content and meaning of relationships, as well as the import of the
overall structure of individual social environments. We coordinated six focus group sessions6 to collect
qualitative accounts on the different experiences of getting a job via social networks in Bogota. The objec-
tive was to understand how individuals choose where to look or who to ask in their job search effort. The
main criterion for structuring the composition of the groups was finding a balance between the diversity
of information extractable from a heterogeneous group, and the incentives to express ideas resulting from
being part of a homogeneous group (Madriz 1998).7 We selected two types of groups;8 the dimension used
for considering the homogeneity of each group was the segment of the labor market in which the members
participate. The reason for this is that the labor market segmentation is fairly strong between low and
high quality jobs (Farné and Vergara 2015; Combarnous and Deguilhem 2016). In addition, this dimension
is linked with income and socioeconomic strata, which summarizes most of the institutional differences in
Colombia.
5120 hours per week is equivalent to more than 17 hours on the workplace, and some studies, using the Time Use Surveys,
have documented that the biological time for the reproduction can not be less than 7 hours per day (Hamermesh and
Stancanelli 2015).
63 sessions of 2 groups (separating vulnerable and protected workers) of 5 individuals on average. Each discussion per
group lasted an average of 90 minutes. During each discussion, the facilitator coordinated the discussion and the participants
provided a narrative of how they got a job. The relator recorded the conversation, took observational notes on the the
participants, marked the time as well as key moments in the discussion.
7People are more comfortable talking when they are with their peers.
8The group members have were selected in the most frequented stations of the Transmilenio (Bus Rapid Transit System
of Bogota) in the city center.
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3 Theoretical framework and empirical strategy
3.1 The differential effects of social networks on a segmented labor market
Some theoretical and empirical studies argue that social networks generate opportunities and are a good
channel for the transmission of job information for job-seekers or employees. For unemployed workers, the
use of ties may reduce the time it takes to exit rates unemployment (Bramoullé and Saint-Paul 2010).
Kramarz and Skans (2014) indicate that parental ties are an important determinant of how Swedish young
workers find and progress in their job. In the United-States, Hispanic men report more frequent use of
friends and relatives for job searches than non-Hispanic, and a majority had found their most recent job
through personal networks (Smith 2000). In developing countries, Magruder (2010) demonstrates that
using the father’s networks has a positive effect on the son’s employment in the South African context.
In India, Beaman and Magruder (2012) provide evidence that some workers, those with high skill levels,
have useful information about the abilities of members of their social network members, reducing the
asymmetrical information problem and making it faster to find a job. In the same way, Nordman and
Pasquier-Doumer (2015) indicate that social networks seem to influence the probability of getting a job
when individuals are unemployed in Burkina Faso. Regarding the positive effect of social networks on
earnings, Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004) demonstrate theoretically that the higher the wages of con-
tacts, the more information they are willing to give to others. They also show that individuals are more
likely to earn higher wages if their contacts are part of more extensive networks and are employed (Calvó-
Armengol and Jackson 2007). Some empirical studies corroborate these results in different institutional
context, showing that those who found their job through family, friends and relatives earned more than
those using formal methods (Kugler 2003; Antoninis 2006). Other authors have documented the positive
correlation between the use of ties and the poverty reduction in China (Zhang et al. 2017).
However, social networks also produce negative effects for specific types of workers on the labor mar-
ket. If social ties are a good channel for receiving new informations on the market opportunities, Brady
(2015) explicates that this effect varies by location, sociodemographic characteristic and type of relation.
Some studies argue that those using contacts earned less than those employing formal means or had no
persistent wage effects (Bentolila et al. 2010). In developing countries, Antoninis (2006) has also argued
that the use of referrals from friends and relatives has no effect on an individual’s starting wage and may
even be negatively related to the wages of unskilled laborers in the Egyptian context. Marques (2012)
has shown that relational settings strongly influence individuals access to markets, leading some Brazilian
people into worse living conditions and poverty. In Malawi, Beaman et al. (2018) has also demonstrated
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that men systematically refer few women, despite being able to refer qualified Indian women when ex-
plicitly asked about female candidates. Moreover, social capital and kinship ties sometimes appear risky;
therefore, they may not be a useful predictor of success –for small-scale fisheries (Crona et al. 2016)–
and could produce an over–embeddedness or redistributive pressure (forced solidarity) for small business
workers or community members (Berrou and Combarnous 2011, 2012; Nguyen and Nordman 2018; Di
Falco et al. 2018).
Confronted with this contrasting literature reviews, we built an original theoretical framework to ex-
plain why these heterogeneous results have been observed. We started from the idea of heterogeneity
between different social groups in terms of ex post job quality, and we assumed that a clear distinction
exists between high and low job quality groups in the labor market (Farné and Vergara 2015; Combarnous
and Deguilhem 2016). To obtain a job, a worker may have used different means with distinct effects
depending on his group (Bentolila et al., 2010). In particular, the use of social networks ex ante can have
two effects for the two heterogeneous groups (Figure 1). In other words, job quality depends on the type
of workers (protected or vulnerable) in the activated network and the differential effects can be especially
related to the form of the links that have actually been activated to get the job in question. Following this
idea illustrated in Figure 1, we can distinguish two basic functions and outline four hypotheses:
• Securing and supporting actors with different types of risk in the labor market. In other words,
networks are seen as a last resort and a social constraint, characterizing a necessary safety net for
the vulnerable (Smith 2000, 2016; Marques 2012).
• Establishing a privileged channel for spreading information about the job opportunities offered or
created. The networks are then considered a means of circulating information within and between
social groups, especially in wealthier groups (Tholen et al. 2013; Sharone 2014).
H1a: For protected workers, networks serve for disseminating information about new and better opportu-
nities.
Protected workers have privileged access to information on new opportunities through the use of “good”
relationships with employees or independents who can contribute to the success of the business. Thus, the
networks of these workers can be considered as a social means to facilitate the flow of specific informations
concerning jobs or ideas (Granovetter 1973, [1974] 1995; Beaman and Magruder 2012), and help employers
to select workers (Ekinci 2016; Hensvik and Skans 2016). In the end, the relationships of workers in this
group can be understood as opportunity networks insofar as their use should lead to a better job. Com-
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Figure 1: Opportunity and necessity networks effects in segmented labor market
Source: Authors.
pared to “formal” means, it seems fairly intuitive to think that the use of these networks should not differ
from the use of other schemes in terms of job quality.
H1b: Opportunity networks are supported by weak ties.
The opportunity networks available to protected workers could be envisaged through the specific charac-
teristics of the links connecting individuals and their activated contacts (Granovetter 1982). Following
Granovetter’s (1973, [1974] 1995) assumption that interpersonal relations may be perceived as the com-
bination of a quantity of time, emotional intensity, intimacy, and reciprocal services, we can distinguish
strong and weak ties. Developing his argument and agreeing with Burt’s (1995) approach, Granovetter
points out that weak ties represent necessary bridges between social groups that would be served without
the existence of these connections and contacts. Thus, this type of ties generates a better circulation
and distribution between groups, while also producing strategic advantages and benefits for intermediate
actors (brokers), who then have new and non-redundant information coming from different groups (Burt
1995; Davern and Hachen 2006). That opportunity networks and “formal” means for protected workers have
similar effects may be due to the availability and the use of weak ties (Granovetter 1982; Yakubovith 2005).
H2a: For vulnerable workers, social networks constitute a “poor quality job trap”.
Conversely in the vulnerable group, workers do not possess information on more favorable employment
quality opportunities (Bentolila et al., 2010), but still use their links to obtain a job despite the weakness
of the proffered positions. Compared to “formal” means, the use of social networks appears negatively
correlated with the job quality, isolating individuals from the best opportunities and increasing their vul-
nerability (Fernandez and Fernandez-Mateo 2006; Marques 2012). This hypothesis seems quite consistent
with many studies that highlight this aggravating factor for unskilled individuals or at the bottom of
8
income distribution (Diaz 2012; Garcia and Nicodemo 2015).
H2b: Necessity networks are supported by strong ties.
In line with what we have mentioned about opportunity relations, this hypothesis can be extended by
the works of Granovetter (1982) and Smith (2000) who argue that these networks of necessity may be
essentially composed of strong ties. In contrast to what we said for the proctected group, we note a “poor
quality trap” process for vulnerable workers, because they do not have weak connections and therefore use
mostly strong relationships with similar workers, accessing redundant information about low employment
quality job opportunities (Smith 2016).
3.2 The quality of employment index
Combarnous and Deguilhem (2016) demonstrate that the quality of employment concept must be situated
in legal and social contexts. Despite this necessity, they show that the following six dimensions mark the
“core” of QoE (Floro and Messier 2011; Osterman 2013; Burchell et al. 2014; Farné and Vergara 2015): (i)
income level, (ii) working conditions and legal status, (iii) the possibilities of reconciling work and family
life, (iv) social securities, (v) collective employment components, (vi) the subjective dimension given to
the job. Specifically in Latin America, some studies establish various QoE indicators by raising the type
of contract, social security coverage, income and working time, multiple activities, workplace, employment
security and/or non-wage benefits.
Following Combarnous and Deguilhem (2016), we opted for a multivariate strategy to formulate the QoE
index. In light of the categorical nature of household survey data, the Multiple Correspondence Analy-
sis (MCA), with its quite robust χ2 metric, constitute an appropriate technique (Greenacre 1993). This
approach is an empirical method adapted to construct a contextualized QoE index based on the factorial
scores of each category of selected QoE indicators (OECD 2008).
Let us assume that the first factorial axis meets the consistency conditions to be considered as a quality
of employment factor. As such, we can define as an appropriate composite indicator: QoE = F1. In this
sense, the QoE index for every worker is calculated from the normalized score of each category of the
variables coming back into the composition of the first factorial axis of the MCA. We can express the
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quality of employment index for the individual i under the following functional form:
QoEi =
∑q
q=1
∑jq
jq=1
W
1,qj
q K
q
i,jq
Q
(1)
Where Q corresponds to the number of categorical or ordinal variables of QoE, W 1,qjq =
w1,qjq√
κ1
is the
normalized category-score jq of the variable q on the first factorial axis κ1. K
q
i,jq
is a binary variable,
taking a value of 1 when the individual i presents the category jq, 0 otherwise.
The value of the QoE index corresponds well to the normalized category-score average on the first factorial
axis of the MCA. We have : QoEi ∈ [−1; 1] that we brought back into [0; 1] by linear interpolation to
make the reading easier. Then, we have a continuous QoE index: QoEi ∈ [0; 1], with 0 corresponding to
the worst possible job quality, and 1 corresponding to the best possible QoE in this social context.
According to legal and socioeconomic institutions in the Bogota’s urban labor market (Farné and Vergara
2015; Combarnous and Deguilhem 2016), we have therefore selected 13 variables to build this QoE index
(Appendix A).
3.3 Finite Mixture Regression Model (FMRM)
This approach simultaneously allows us to identify heterogeneous groups and to estimate each specific
regression model an econometric strategy derived from McLachlan and Peel (2000), Deb et al. (2011)
and Günther and Launov (2012)–. When applying a FMRM, the number of groups is not known and
must therefore be inferred from the data. Choosing the number of components C can then be carried out
with different methods, depending on which has placed a greater interest in the quality of the adjustment
of density or in the detection of distinct groups (McLachlan and Peel 2000). Thus, if the main interest
concerns the estimation of density, the proper method is to select the value C which minimizes the AIC
and the BIC (Ben Salem and Bensidoun 2012).
In order to analyze the effect of social networks on the QoE index in a segmented context, the mix-
ture of linear regressions serves to specify the conditional expectation of a dependent variable (QoE) as a
linear function of the use of ties (SNW ) and other explanatory variables. In this way, we use three blocks
of explanatory variables (S):9 individual (education, gender, marital status, age), household (socioeco-
nomic strata)10 and employment characteristics (activity sector). One approach is to likewise specify the
9For more variable details, see Appendix B.
10Socioeconomic strata are a proxy for geographical opposition between South and North.
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average of the density functions for each of the mixture groups.
The average of the densities is obtained from the FMRM estimation, as conditional on the values of
the variable of interest SNW and other explanatory variables S. Looking at two components (C = 2),
we consider the following Gaussian mixture model, where 1i et 2i are independent error terms, identically
distributed following a normal distribution:
C1: QoE1i = β
1
0 + SNW
1
i β
1
1 + S
1
i β
1
2 + 
1
i
C2: QoE2i = β
2
0 + SNW
2
i β
2
1 + S
2
i β
2
2 + 
2
i
 (2)
This analysis would be fine if the use of social networks were completely independent from others observ-
able characteristics. However, the decision whether to use social networks is not randomly distributed
(Appendix B). It is likely that some of the individuals who may be in specific situations choose not to use
contacts and this would be considered in the estimation process. In fact, some studies in Latin America
demonstrate that being poor, having a low educational level and working in small firm size increase the
probability of using ties (Portes 2010; Marques 2012). We resolve that issue by applying the Heckman two-
step approach (1979): (i.) estimate a selection equation with a Probit model and determine the correction
parameter (λ) corresponding to Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) for each individual, (ii.) include this correction
as a predictor in the determination equations. Thus, the linear regression mixture model (FMRM) that
we estimate in the next section can be formalized as follow (with always C = 2):
C1: QoE1i = β
1
0 + SNW
1
i β
1
1 +X
1
i β
1
2 + Z
1
i β
1
3 + E
1
i β
1
4 + λ
1
iβ
1
5 + 
1
i
C2: QoE2i = β
2
0 + SNW
2
i β
2
1 +X
1
i β
2
2 + Z
2
i β
2
3 + E
2
i β
2
4 + λ
2
iβ
2
5 + 
2
i
 (3)
In the last determination equations (3), the model offers to regress the dependent variable QoEc on the
variable of interest SNW c for each component, controlled by a set of covariables: individual Xc, household
Zc, employment characteristics Ec and an error term c. According to the Heckman two-step procedure,
these specifications also include the coefficient λc.
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4 Differential effects of using ties in Bogota’s segmented labor
market
4.1 Descriptive analysis
The distribution of QoE index clearly shows two different modes (Figure 2), proving a polarization in the
quality of employment in Bogota and forming two groups of QoE. On the left-hand side, the first mode
represents a “poor” quality of employment for precarious and vulnerable workers whereas on the right-hand
side, the second mode shows a “strong” quality group, benefiting from social and lawful protection. Con-
firming Combarnous and Deguilhem (2016), the summary statistics reported in Appendix B demonstrate
that it is more relevant to treat the gap between “good” and “bad” jobs rather than to analyze status
typology (Bocquier et al. 2010).
Figure 2: QoE index and QoE index by using ties to get a job, GIHS (2013)
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Figure 3: QoE index for independents and employees, GIHS (2013)
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Figures 2 and 3 show the bimodal distribution of the use of ties for all workers, employees and indepen-
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dents. Indeed, among those who mobilized ties, both populations –vulnerable and protected workers– use
social relations to obtain a job. In other words, the different social “circles” constitute reference groups
affecting relational practices, social behaviors and labor market outcomes (Granovetter [1974] 1995; Bott
2002; Grossetti 2005). This inter-group heterogeneity illustrated by Figures 2 and 3 justifies our use of
FMRM in the estimation step. Moreover, we check the relevance of this empirical strategy with quantile
regressions. Indeed, we consider different percentiles in the QoE index distribution so as to test the sta-
bility and robustness of the FMRM estimations. In this way, we switch between a semi-parametric to a
non-parametric model with bootstrapped standard errors to compare with a robust standard deviation in
the models of interest (Appendix D).
4.2 Estimation results
Confirming Figures 2 and 3, Table 1 shows that separating QoE into two segments is preferable to other
options looking for information criteria values. The parameters can thereby be clearly identified and we
avoid the over-parametrized problem (Ben Salem and Bensidoun, 2012).
Table 1: Model selection and number of components
Total sample Employees Independents
AIC BICa AIC BICa AIC BICa
2 Components 6563.36 6420.04 5017.58 4756.46 1551.77 1463.21
3 Components 6652.98 6436.24 5141.77 4943.93 1690.20 1556.27
4 Components 7130.78 6840.63 5251.16 4986.30 1803.93 1624.64
Note: a Sample size adjusted BIC.
Source: Authors, Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE): www.
dane.gov.co
Tables 2, 3 and 4 present the estimation results (FMRM and OLS) of the QoE index for the total sample,
with employees and independents represented separately. The significance of the IMR correction term (λ)
for all specifications actually suggests that certain variables influence an individual’s decision to mobilize
their networks and their quality of employment in the Bogota labor market. The estimation of a FMRM
without correction term would have led to biased estimated coefficients. In fact, the use of social networks
is well established as the main mode of employment distribution in the Colombian capital (Combarnous
and Deguilhem 2016), despite its weakening among the most educated and large scale business workers. In
other words, the Probit estimations (selection stage) verify that people who have predominantly used their
relationships to obtain their current job are less educated and less likely to work in large firms (Portes 2010;
Marques 2012) (Appendix C). These observations tend to confirm the perception of a potential selection
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bias, as described in the previous section.
Furthermore, the different OLS estimates reported in the Tables 2, 3 and 4 show that the use of so-
cial networks is on average significantly anti-correlated with the QoE of individuals (-3.3% for the total
sample, -2.8% for the employees and -4.5% for the independents). This result, which obviously does not
distinguish between workers but gives an average coefficient, suggests a general negative relation between
this mode of social intermediation to increase the job quality in Bogota. However, it is clear that these
results contrast sharply with those of the estimates from the FMRM models.
In fact, observing FMRM estimations presented in the Tables 2, 3 and 4, we clearly notice the differen-
tial effects of using ties between vulnerable and protected workers. In the first component, vulnerable
people are effectively penalized in their quality of employment when they use their networks. Conversely,
participants (protected) in the second do not show any significant decrease or increase in their quality of
employment following the mobilization of their networks compared to other formal channels.
More specifically, we find that the use of contacts is significantly anti-correlated (respectively -3.6% for
all workers, -3.3% for employees and -4.5% for independents) with job quality within the lower group
(Tables 2, 3 and 4). This result confirms the H2a hypothesis and also appears quite consistent with other
studies conducted in Latin America, reporting this relational intermediation as a penalizing factor for
unskilled individuals or for those at the bottom of income distribution (Diaz 2012; Marques 2012; Garcia
and Nicodemo 2015). In order to test the robustness of this relationship and whether it would not be the
result of a statistical artifact related to the determination of the two groups, we keep the same specification
in the quantile regressions. Confirming the FMRM results, this negative and significant correlation arises
in the first percentiles of the distribution of the job quality index (q10, q20 and q30, Appendix D). In other
words, for vulnerable individuals, the use of networks significantly affects their job quality, making them
less protected than they already were.
For the protected workers, we observe that the use of contacts compared to more formal means is not
significantly correlated with the quality of their employment (Tables 2, 3 and 4). This result tends to
confirm the hypothesis H1a and seems to be robust compared to quantile estimates on the total sample
and for employees, except for independents (Appendix D). Indeed, quantile regressions reported in the same
Appendix D verify the FMRM estimations and suggest a relevant break in the negative and significant
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Table 2: FMRM and OLS for QoE index (total sample), GIHS (2013)
FMRM OLS
Variable Component 1 Component 2
Social Networks -0.036*** -0.001 -0.033***
(0.009) (0.002) (0.005)
Age 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Age2 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Gender (women) -0.013* -0.002 -0.011**
(0.007) (0.003) (0.005)
Strata 2 0.011 0.019*** 0.028***
(0.009) (0.005) (0.008)
Strata 3 0.030*** 0.023*** 0.037***
(0.010) (0.005) (0.009)
Strata 4, 5 et 6 0.087*** 0.023*** 0.068***
(0.016) (0.006) (0.012)
Married 0.016** 0.005 0.012**
(0.008) (0.003) (0.006)
λ 0.581*** 0.061*** 0.504***
(0.017) (0.007) (0.011)
σc 0.148 0.051
(0.002) (0.001)
pic
a 0.547 0.452
(0.010) (0.010)
Constant 0.145*** 0.724*** 0.291***
(0.030) (0.013) (0.025)
Log-likelihood 3322.68
Wald χ2 7032.43***
Adjusted R2 0.497
VIF (average) 4.88
N 5846 5846
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses (Eicker-White
correction) and the FMRM model converges in 14 iterations. Re-
gressions also include activity sector dummies. The first compo-
nent is the low quality of employment range and inversely for the
second component.
a pic is the probability that an observation is in component c.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Source: Authors, Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Es-
tadística (DANE): www.dane.gov.co
correlation between the use of networks and the quality of employment from the seventh decile for employees
and the eighth decile for the total sample (q70, q80 and q90). In other words, for the 20% of the most
protected workers in the sample (30% for employees), the correlation between their use of relationships
and their quality of employment appears visibly insignificant.
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Table 3: FMRM and OLS for QoE index (employees), GIHS (2013)
FMRM OLS
Variable Component 1 Component 2
Social Networks -0.033*** 0.000 -0.028***
(0.010) (0.003) (0.006)
Age 0.002 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age2 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education 0.001 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Gender (women) -0.010 -0.002 -0.012*
(0.008) (0.003) (0.006)
Strata 2 0.002 0.016*** 0.028***
(0.010) (0.006) (0.010)
Strata 3 0.023* 0.020*** 0.036***
(0.012) (0.006) (0.010)
Strata 4, 5 et 6 0.062*** 0.018** 0.043***
(0.017) (0.007) (0.013)
Married 0.012 0.004 0.010
(0.010) (0.004) (0.007)
λ 0.581*** 0.054*** 0.472***
(0.022) (0.007) (0.013)
σc 0.148 0.052
(0.003) (0.001)
pic
a 0.519 0.481
(0.011) (0.011)
Constant 0.126*** 0.730*** 0.288***
(0.033) (0.014) (0.028)
Log-likelihood 2549.79
Wald χ2 5339.51***
Adjusted R2 0.475
VIF (average) 4.77
N 4310 4310
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses (Eicker-White
correction) and the FMRM model converges in 14 iterations. Re-
gressions also include activity sector dummies. The first compo-
nent is the low quality of employment range and inversely for the
second component.
a pic is the probability that an observation is in component c.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Source: Authors, Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Es-
tadística (DANE): www.dane.gov.co
4.3 Necessity networks as “bad quality job trap”
Exploring the negative and significant correlation between using ties and the QoE index, two explanations
have appeared relevant from the focus group interviews with vulnerable workers.
First, weak ties present an advantage by providing timely access to new and non-redundant informa-
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Table 4: FMRM and OLS for QoE index (independents), GIHS (2013)
FMRM OLS
Variable Component 1 Component 2
Social Networks -0.045** -0.005 -0.045***
(0.020) (0.005) (0.011)
Age -0.004 0.001 -0.003
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Age2 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education 0.004** 0.002** 0.003**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Gender (women) -0.006 -0.010 -0.002
(0.015) (0.007) (0.012)
Strata 2 0.052** 0.035*** 0.031*
(0.020) (0.010) (0.018)
Strata 3 0.074*** 0.041*** 0.056***
(0.022) (0.010) (0.019)
Strata 4, 5 et 6 0.185*** 0.049*** 0.151***
(0.030) (0.013) (0.023)
Married 0.021 0.007 0.019*
(0.014) (0.006) (0.011)
λ 0.525*** 0.064*** 0.516***
(0.030) (0.013) (0.020)
σc 0.153 0.050
(0.004) (0.002)
pic
a 0.575 0.425
(0.020) (0.020)
Constant 0.265** 0.696*** 0.363***
(0.077) (0.035) (0.061)
Log-likelihood 816.89
Wald χ2 4800.69***
Adjusted R2 0.524
VIF (average) 5.58
N 1536 1536
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses (Eicker-White
correction) and the FMRM model converges in 17 iterations. Re-
gressions also include activity sector dummies. The first compo-
nent is the low quality of employment range and inversely for the
second component.
a pic is the probability that an observation is in component c.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Source: Authors, Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Es-
tadística (DANE): www.dane.gov.co
tion, and by directly influencing employers (Yakubovitch 2005; Davern and Hachen 2006). In contrast,
strong ties are associated with poor and redundant information, or with indirect influence on employers
through well-connected intermediaries (Yakubovitch 2005). Finally, weak ties have been found to be more
beneficial in accessing new information and to be an instrumental means in finding new jobs (Granovetter
1973; [1974] 1995). The three focus groups with vulnerable workers highlights that they are more likely
to have and to use strong ties to obtain their current job. This qualitative observation could explain the
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negative correlation between relational embeddedness and the job quality for them (Tables 2, 3 and 4). In
this way, Gloria, a 47-year-old woman living in stratum 2, highlighted her expectations of improving her
quality of life. She explained that she directly contacted her close neighborhood friends to find a better job.
After referring her to their employers, she finally obtained a job but it was not better than the previous one.
Harold, a 26-year-old man living in stratum 3, found his last job through his father’s contacts, but he had
long working hours in a large company. They created a local union to negotiate better working conditions,
but two months after the beginning of the negotiations, Harold was fired without unemployment benefits.
Second, we also could explain the negative correlation through the similarity shared between contacts
in the social network of the vulnerable. Indeed, homophily isolates workers who present the same social
characteristics as others with different attributes, which then limits the extent to which individuals in one
group hear about openings and opportunities known to the other group (Reagans and Zuckerman 2001;
Jackson et al. 2017). In other words, workers appealing to contacts who are in a same social situation
(sharing the same characteristics) have a lower probability of achieving high labor market outcomes than
workers appealing to diverse contacts who are in better social positions. In the focus groups of low job
quality workers, we find that they have rarely contacted their parents or close friends in better positions
than themselves because of trust issues. Patricia, a 30-year-old woman living in stratum 2, had been
searching a job via specialized web pages and professional contacts who were in better social and occupa-
tional positions. However, these means proved unfruitful: her relatives’ lack of information regarding her
preferences and background as well as these websites being “unadapted” to her profile made the job search
difficult. She found a job through close friends and family contacts in the same social position. Vanesa, a
woman who lives in stratum 3, was in her fourth month of unemployment and was struggling to maintain
her living standards. She had obtained her job through her mother’s contacts with approximately the
same social position as herself. Ultimately, she found a job with lower responsibilities and the same salary
as the one before.
At the end, these qualitative results tend to confirm the H2b hypothesis presented in Section 3. Thanks
to the focus groups interviews, we found that strong and homophilic ties are simultaneously a unique
instrument of last resort and a negative resource for increasing the quality of employment for vulnerable
workers, explaining the negative and significant correlation between using social networks and job quality.
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4.4 Are opportunity networks really appropriate for accessing high quality
jobs?
We observe quantitatively that the use of networks is not significantly correlated with the QoE index for the
protected workers (Tables 2, 3 and 4). We use the focus group interviews to better identify the relational
mechanisms behind this result. Exploring it qualitatively, the non-negative correlation for these workers
could be explained by their use of different types of networks (weak, professional and heterophilic ties) to
obtain a job unlike vulnerable workers. However, this lack of significance could come from (i.) a social
acceptance of worse working conditions in the short run (over-loyalty and over-subordination effects), (ii.)
because using ties over formal means could send a bad signal to the labor market. Protected workers have
all the necessary information and skills to obtain a job via other formal means but by choosing ties, they
miss out on better opportunities.
Some studies show that the advantages of weak ties are clear for high-skilled workers (Granovetter [1974]
1995; Sharone 2014). The three focus groups of high job quality workers highlight that a majority has
used weak ties to obtain their current job, and this can explain the non-negative correlation. Paula, a
26-year-old woman living in stratum 3, pointed out that she had found her previous job through a second-
degree contact. Indeed, she had received information from a school friend’s uncle who worked at the firm.
She was ultimately unsatisfied and decided to look for a new job. During this period, she received a lot
of job offers sent by her school and professional contacts. Finally, she found her current job through the
recommendation of an educated relative and in witch she has better responsibilities, a higher salary, and
fewer working hours than in her last job. Camilo, a 28-year-old man living in stratum 4, pointed out that
family members and close friends could not help him in the job search process. While a school friend had
recommended him to his contacts, Camilo did not know them. He explained that for him this network
process appeared “murky.” There seems to be a signal effect: people did not know each other, but everyone
in the network was trustworthy because they had the same educational background.
Moreover, individuals appealing to heterophilic contacts who are in a better social position have a higher
probability of achieving better labor market outcomes (Reagans and Zuckerman 2001; Lin 2002). In the
focus groups of these workers, we find that they have often contacted friends or relatives in a better po-
sition than themselves because their recommendations have greater impact than those of others. Odys, a
55-year-old woman living in the stratum 4, found clients through her managing directors’ contacts. She
has professional network with people in a better social position than herself that is effective because of
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their influence and provision of opportunities. Albeit she sometimes accepts lesser working conditions in
order to maintain this professional network. Carlos, a 23-year-old man who lives in stratum 4, found his
last job at the Central Bank of Colombia. In this occupational position, he had a strong professional
network that sent him new job opportunities by mail. Using this means, Carlos found a job opportunity
at the university. However, he did not apply there directly; a professional contact recommended him to a
professor, who was the department director, allowing him to obtain the job. Yet in this new job, he ac-
cepted worse working conditions than his previous one. He explained that he needed to show his skills and
his loyalty to the new occupational position, pending the transition towards better professional projects.
The over-subordination effect in the short run appears clearly in some cases of this group.
These qualitative results tend to confirm the H1b hypothesis presented in Section 3. Indeed, we show
that weak, professional, and heterophilic ties constitute a better job channel, but they also generate an
over-loyalty and over-subordination effect, conceivably explaining the non-positive correlation between
using social relations and job quality.
5 Discussions
Thanks to a mixed approach, we have investigated the correlation between the use of social ties and the
job quality in Bogota’s labor market. Confirming Combarnous and Deguilhem (2016), our results demon-
strate the relevance of treating the divide between vulnerable and protected workers rather than analyzing
status typology (Bocquier et al. 2010). Quantitatively, the semi-parametric estimation (FMRM) shows
a differential relation between social networks and the quality of employment for both groups. Indeed,
we found a negative and significant correlation for vulnerable workers, and a non-significant correlation
for protected ones. Qualitatively, we observe some different types of relational practices in terms of the
strength of ties and social resources embedded in the networks of both worker’ groups, explaining the
quantitative effects. Confirming some of the sociological and economic literature, we show that strong
and homophilic ties generates constraints for vulnerable workers. Conversely, weak, professional, and
heterophilic ties constitute a productive job channel for protected people. However, these relations also
engender over-loyalty and over-subordination effects, conceivably explaining why networks do not have a
positive and significant correlation with the QoE index for these workers. Finally, these results provide
lessons for improving the SPE for vulnerable workers in Bogota. In Colombia, this SPE was established
in the last trimester of 2013, but the decree 2521 of 2013, which makes online registration a requirement
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for receiving unemployment benefits (cesantia), has greatly contributed to its expansion from more than
216,000 registrations in Bogota in 2014 to 476,000 in 2015 (SPE 2017). Despite this success, as well as the
limitations posed by the need for online registration, the targeting of vulnerable workers is questionable.
In 2017, nearly 30% of unemployed workers in the capital had a university degree, and more than 20% de-
clared themselves to be proficient in economics, humanities and social or educational sciences (SPE 2017).
In light of our results, the SPE could redirect its action and specifically target vulnerable workers who
would profit more by going through formal means than through their networks to increase their job quality.
The endogeneity, coming from a reverse causality, between the QoE index and the use of ties could
be major issue (Mouw 2006). However, three remarks supports the results facing this problem. First,
we analyze this relation only in terms of correlation insofar as the identification of a causal relationship
from the networks remains very delicate (Fafchamps 2015; Shen and Bian 2018). Second, we capture the
use of networks with an ex ante variable, while the measure of the QoE index is calculated from ex post
variables (Appendix A). In other words, the relational variable reveals a retardation behavior before the
current occupational status. Third, we can reasonably assume that this inverse causality supports the
effects observed in the FMRM estimations. Indeed, some studies show that vulnerable workers receive
little information about the possible opportunities because of their contacts’ shared characteristics, such
as the residential neighborhood, ethnicity, or conformism in individual practices through relationships
(Fernandez and Fernandez-Mateo 2006; Smith 2016; Jackson et al. 2017; Parkinson et al. 2018).
Finally, given the limited number of variables in the GIHS, we had no opportunity to control for the
cognitive and non-cognitive skills of the workers. Instead, we use a proxy with the number of years of
education. Indeed, we could assume that the differential negative effects of relational factor on the QoE
index is also influenced by workers’ cognitive abilities and non-cognitive skills (Heckman et al. 2006).
Furthermore, we think that geographical factors matter in analyzing the use of the social networks to get
a job (Calvó-Armengol and Zenou 2005; Sato and Zenou 2015). However, we only refer to the socioe-
conomic stratum of each worker because do not have other spatial variables in the survey. Finally, this
investigation of social networks allows us to distinguish between formal and relational means, but we have
been unable to quantitatively explore the strength of ties, the structural dimensions of networks and the
contacts’ attributes, as well as to develop a social network analysis of ego-centered data (Nordman and
Pasquier-Doumer 2015; Crossley et al. 2015; Berrou and Combarnous 2017).
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Appendix A
Table A.1: Indicators of the QoE index, GIHS (2013)
Indicators Characterizations
Income 1 if individual earns less than the minimum wage (MW); 2 if individual earns
less than 2 MW; 3 if individual earns less than 4 MW; 4 if individual earns
more than 4 MW
Stability 1 if more than 1 year; 2 if not
Contract completeness See the note under the table
Other activity 1 if yes; 2 if not
Workplace 1 if individual works in hard local; 2 if household work; 3 if other
Transport 1 if individual has transport benefits; 2 if not
Time 1 if individual works less than 24 hours per week; 2 if he works between 24
and 48 hours per week (legal employment); 3 if he works more than 48 hours
per week
Social security 1 if individual contributes to social security; 2 if he has special social security
(Army, Ecopetrol, Public University); 3 if he has subsidized social security; 4
if not
Occupation risk 1 if individual has an occupation protection; 2 if not
Pension 1 if individual has a pension; 2 if not
Family fund 1 if individual has a family protection system; 2 if not
Union 1 if he is in a union; 2 if not
Subjectivity See the note under the table
Note: The Contract completeness indicator is a scoring variable constructed from seven variables of contract
composition. Category 0 illustrates the situation of workers without any forms of contract; category 1
identifies the primary elements of formal contract. Category 2 marks the passage to a written contract, but
contents of which remain rather weak. Category 3 marks the appearance of social contents in contracts, 4
and 5 are complete contracts. We do not presume the importance of every category, of this fact weighting
method is not necessary. The Subjectivity indicator constitutes an objective indicator of the subjective
representations. Like the QoE index, this variable is a synthesis constructed across MCA from eight
variables expressing the necessity of change and the satisfaction of workers. The first factorial axis explaining
more than 88% of the corrected eigenvalues (Greenacre 1993), it can be defined as the factor of workers’
satisfaction. After analysis of distribution, we have discretized this quantitative variable in three groups: 1
is a good satisfaction level and a will to stay in current job, 2 is an intermediate satisfaction level and 3 a
dissatisfaction level.
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Table B.1: Descriptive statistics, GIHS (2013)
Total sample Social Net. Social Net. (Employees) Social Net. (Independents)
Yes No Yes No Yes No
QoE index 0.6214 0.5592 0.7365 0.5743 0.7399 0.5207 0.7252
SD. (0.258) (0.273) (0.178) (0.269) (0.180) (0.277) (0.171)
Income (per hour) 5926.31 5243.93 7187.99 5225.69 7421.19 5290.48 6398.69
SD. (7918.46) (6943.69) (9331.15) (6561.40) (9843.68) (7838.49) (7289.36)
Age 44.78 44.75 44.84 43.07 42.89 49.04 51.43
SD. (14.55) (14.50) (14.64) (14.80) (14.47) (12.73) (13.23)
Education (years) 10.09 9.60 10.98 9.77 11.36 9.17 9.72
SD. (4.82) (4.73) (4.85) (4.62) (4.77) (5.00) (4.94)
Number of people 3.45 3.50 3.37 3.28 3.19 4.05 3.96
SD. ( 1.56) (1.57) (1.52) (1.55) (1.51) (1.50) (1.41)
Gender, women (%) 36.08 35.66 36.84 38.63 38.95 28.10 29.70
Married (%) 28.02 27.28 29.39 23.51 26.70 36.89 38.46
Strata 1 (%) 11.60 11.89 11.06 12.40 11.17 10.58 10.68
Strata 2 (%) 44.44 45.97 41.62 47.21 41.35 42.79 42.52
Strata 3 (%) 33.73 32.50 36.01 31.51 35.80 35.02 36.75
Strata 4a (%) 10.23 9.65 11.31 8.88 11.68 11.61 10.04
Internet at home (%) 54.02 50.42 60.67 47.14 58.02 58.80 69.66
At least one car (%) 20.87 19.74 22.95 15.85 21.91 29.98 26.50
Owner (%) 30.36 29.44 32.07 26.96 28.41 35.77 44.44
Self-employed (%) 5.80 8.59 0.63 9.00 0.69 7.58 0.43
2-5 employees (%) 18.66 25.88 5.31 23.26 5.74 32.58 3.85
6-10 employees (%) 8.40 10.25 4.97 10.31 5.11 10.11 4.45
11-50 employees (%) 15.45 17.32 11.99 18.20 10.86 15.07 15.81
51-100 employees (%) 5.20 4.69 6.14 5.00 6.12 3.93 6.20
More than 100 employees (%) 46.49 33.26 70.96 34.26 71.46 30.71 69.23
Manufacturing (%) 16.62 16.70 16.47 16.87 16.04 16.29 17.94
Commercial services (%) 17.19 18.90 14.04 18.09 13.19 20.97 16.80
Transport (%) 8.18 8.17 8.19 8.80 7.51 6.55 10.47
Finance, Real Estate (%) 18.73 16.39 23.05 15.85 22.98 17.79 23.29
Domestic work (%) 9.80 13.31 3.31 13.50 3.35 12.83 3.21
Hotels, Restaurants (%) 7.63 8.80 5.46 9.06 5.74 8.15 4.49
Public Administration (%) 4.53 2.21 8.82 2.31 9.60 1.97 6.20
Education private/public (%) 6.10 3.82 10.33 3.78 10.54 3.93 9.62
Social and medical (%) 5.23 4.35 6.87 4.37 7.01 4.31 6.41
N 5846 3794 2052 2726 1584 1068 468
Note: aStrata 4 aggregates the stratas 4, 5 and 6.
Source: Authors, , Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE): www.dane.gov.co
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Table C.1: Marginal effects on the probability of using networks, GIHS (2013)
Variable Probit(1) Probit(2) Probit(3)
Education (ICFES) -0.039** (0.017) -0.038* (0.020) -0.050 (0.032)
Education (Techno.) -0.101*** (0.023) -0.117*** (0.027) -0.059 (0.044)
Education (Univers.) -0.085*** (0.001) -0.121*** (0.029) 0.015 (0.039)
Age -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001)
Gender (women) -0.007 (0.014) -0.008 (0.016) 0.016 (0.026)
Internet -0.011 (0.015) 0.003 (0.017) -0.054** (0.026)
Nb. people 0.005 (0.004) 0.002 (0.005) 0.007 (0.008)
Car 0.028 (0.018) -0.002 (0.023) 0.074** (0.028)
Owner -0.001 (0.017) 0.010 (0.020) -0.028 (0.028)
2-5 employees -0.190*** (0.053) -0.233*** (0.059) -0.101 (0.110)
6-10 employees -0.371*** (0.052) -0.374*** (0.056) -0.359*** (0.125)
11-50 employees -0.435*** (0.046) -0.399*** (0.053) -0.524*** (0.102)
51-100 employees -0.548*** (0.037) -0.530*** (0.041) -0.613*** (0.084)
More than 100 -0.601*** (0.033) -0.599*** (0.037) -0.596*** (0.078)
Log-likelihood -3255.98 -2455.27 -775.71
LR χ2 1065.26*** 758.15*** 337.19***
Adjusted Pseudo R2 (McFadden) 0.137 0.128 0.163
R2 (Effron) 0.165 0.161 0.190
Predict. P. 0.683 0.661 0.751
N 5846 4310 1536
Note: The first model treats all sample, the second treats only the employees and the third only the
independents. Standard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Source: Authors, Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE): www.dane.gov.co
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Table D.1: Quantile regression (Total sample), GISH (2013)
Quantile regression
Variable q10 q20 q30 q70 q80 q90
Social Networks -0.043*** -0.032*** -0.025*** -0.011*** -0.004 -0.003
(0.011) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Controls :
Individual characteristicsa X X X X X X
Household characteristicsa X X X X X X
Employment characteristicsa X X X X X X
λ X X X X X X
Pseudo R2 0.327 0.425 0.456 0.146 0.107 0.070
N 5846 5846 5846 5846 5846 5846
Note: a The same variables as the fmrm regressions are used.
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthesis (500 replications).
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Source: Authors, Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE): www.
dane.gov.co
Table D.2: Quantile regression (Employees), GISH (2013)
Quantile regression
Variable q10 q20 q30 q70 q80 q90
Social Networks -0.051*** -0.030*** -0.022*** -0.007 -0.003 -0.001
(0.014) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Controls :
Individual characteristicsa X X X X X X
Household characteristicsa X X X X X X
Employment characteristicsa X X X X X X
λ X X X X X X
Pseudo R2 0.338 0.425 0.439 0.128 0.094 0.062
N 4310 4310 4310 4310 4310 4310
Note: a The same variables as the fmrm regressions are used.
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthesis (500 replications).
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Source: Authors, Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE): www.
dane.gov.co
Table D.3: Quantile regression (Independents), GISH (2013)
Quantile regression
Variable q10 q20 q30 q70 q80 q90
Social Networks -0.043*** -0.054*** -0.034** -0.027** -0.018* -0.014**
(0.030) (0.019) (0.014) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007)
Controls :
Individual characteristicsa X X X X X X
Household characteristicsa X X X X X X
Employment characteristicsa X X X X X X
λ X X X X X X
Pseudo R2 0.274 0.387 0.446 0.211 0.145 0.104
N 1536 1536 1536 1536 1536 1536
Note: a The same variables as the fmrm regressions are used.
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthesis (500 replications).
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Source: Authors, Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE): www.
dane.gov.co
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